We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the Egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality.
Introduction
An n-person bargaining problem consists of a pair (S, d) where S is a non-empty subset of n , and d ∈ S. The set S is interpreted as the set of utility allocations that are attainable through joint action by all n agents. If the agents fail to reach an agreement, then the problem is settled at the point d, which is called the disagreement point. A
bargaining solution F , defined on a class of problems Σ n , is a map that associates with each problem (S, d) ∈ Σ n a unique point in S. In the axiomatic approach to bargaining we start by specifying a list of properties (Pareto-optimality, for example) that we would like a solution to satisfy. If it can be shown that there is a unique solution that satisfies a given list of axioms, then the solution is said to be characterized this list.
It is common to restrict the domain to problems with convex feasible sets. The standard justification for restricting attention to convex problems is an assumption that agents' preferences can be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and then admitting the use of lotteries. We find this approach unappealing, for two reasons. First, the von Neuman-Morgenstern hypothesis is often rejected in empirical studies and several alternatives have been proposed, see Fishburn (1989) for a systematic exposition. Second, if lotteries are allowed the interpretation of the axioms becomes problematic, see Conley and Wilkie (1989) . Recently several papers have adopted the axiomatic approach without the convexity assumption, see Anant et al. (1990) , Herrero (1989) , and Kaneko (1980) .
In this paper we require only that the feasible set be comprehensive. This is equivalent to assuming free disposal in any underlying economic problem. Our results may 
Definitions and Axioms
We start with some definitions and formal statements of the axioms used in the characterizations. Given a point d ∈ n , and a set S ⊂ n , we say S is d-comprehensive
The comprehensive hull of a set S ⊂ n , with respect to a point d ∈ n is the smallest d-comprehensive set containing S:
The convex hull of a set S ⊂ n is the smallest convex set containing the set S:
Define the weak Pareto set of S as:
Define the strong Pareto set of S as:
The domain of bargaining problems considered in this paper is Σ n c . This is defined as the class of pairs (S, d) where S ⊂ n and d ∈ n such that:
The axioms used in this paper are:
A permutation operator, π, is a bijection from {1, 2, . . . , n} to {1, 2, . . . , n}. Π n is the class of all such operators. Let
An affine transformation on n is a map, λ : n → n , where for some a ∈ n and b ∈ n ++ , λ(x) = a + bx. Λ n is the class of all such transformations. Let
The Ideal Point of a problem (S,d) is defined as:
The Results
First we show the impossibility result.
2 Subscripts indicate the components of a vector. 
where max is with respect to the partial order on R n . The axioms used are equivalent to those used by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) to characterize K on the convex domain with two agents, except that only weak Pareto-optimality is used. For further discussion see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Thomson (1986) . Then K(S, d) = (α, . . . , α) ≡ x for some α > 0. Let T be defined as:
and consider the problem (T, 0). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1) S ⊂ n + . Since S is comprehensive and x ∈ W P (S), we have S ⊆ T . Also, since T is symmetric, d = 0, and x is the only symmetric element W P (T ), by W.P.O. and SYM, F (T, 0) = x. However, since S ⊂ T , and a(S, 0) = a(T, 0) = y, by R.MON 
Case ii) S ⊂ n + . Let V be defined as follows,
Note that V is symmetric and S ⊂ V . If we replace (T, 0) the previous argument with (V, 0) the proof goes through as before.
Last we examine the egalitarian solution, E,
We show that Kalai's (1977) characterization of E is true on the comprehensive domain. By assumption, S is compact. Thus, there exists β ∈ such that x ∈ S implies ( β, . . . , β) . Let Z be the symmetric closed hypercube defined by:
Also define T as:
Consider the problem (T ; 0). Since T is symmetric, d = 0 and x is the only symmetric element of W P (T ), by W.P.O. and SYM, F (T , d) = x. But since S ⊆ T , by S.MON,
Concluding Comments
In this paper we have examined the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Egalitarian bargaining solutions without the hypothesis that the feasible set is convex. We require only that the feasible set be comprehensive. We show that well known characterizations of these solutions extend to this domain. The comprehensive domain arises naturally from an assumption of free disposal on the underlying economic problem.
In a recent paper, Anant et al (1990) show that the Kalai-Smorodinsky theorem can be extended directly on the domain of two person "NE-Regular" problems where, below the ideal point the weak Pareto and Pareto sets coincide. Our first theorem shows that it is impossible to extend their result to the domain of comprehensive problems.
However, since the set of comprehensive problems includes this class of NE-Regular problems, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is always strongly Pareto-optimal on this class, our axioms imply strong Pareto-optimality on the domain of NE-Regular problems. Thus our second theorem implies the theorem of Anant et al (1990) .
The work of Anant et al (1990) and this paper, suggests that the assumption of a convex feasible set is not essential for any Monotone Path Solution. Since any Monotone Path Solution is well-defined on the domain of comprehensive problems any characterization found on the domain of convex problems should be easy to adapt.
This class of solutions is discussed and axiomatized Thomson (1986) , pp 52-57. It is straightforward to extend this result to our domain.
